No one outside the economic community is a more forceful opponent of market concentration than I am, and the 2008 financial crisis is a big reason why. My family was not affected, but we’re all extremely conservative about money. So is the Canadian banking system. The American one used to be, but the inescapable truth is that if that hadn’t changed, much of the fallout might have been avoided – leading some experts to wonder if it isn’t time to go back to the future.
The discussion centers on two important pieces of banking legislation: the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. While both bills cover multiple facets, they mostly come up because of their effects on the nature of the banking industry. The former restricted activities between commercial banks and securities firms. The latter repealed those barriers, on the grounds that individuals could put money into savings and investments at the same time and only have to worry about the investments in hard times.
While I don’t consider myself knowledgeable enough about banking to conclude whether or not Glass-Steagall should be revived, I do wish to address a couple of arguments made against the idea. The first, from Moshe Orenbuch of Credit Suisse: “You could get a financial system that could not be able to sustain itself in times of crisis if you don’t have large banks. There’s ample evidence that large, well-run banks provide benefits to the economy.” This financial system wasn’t able to sustain itself in times of crisis. Furthermore, Canada has large banks, too!
The second, from Dick Bove of Rochdale Securities: “There are in fact laws in this country, and you can’t simply go and tell a company you’ve got to be broken up because we want you to be broken up.” Does he not realize that the process that breaking up the largest banks would entail comes from a law? Nobody’s overstepping any boundaries.
The third, from Bove again, is that “conventional banking” is no guarantee because plenty of regional banks failed during the financial crisis and afterward. Would he then like to argue that these banks should have been bigger and fewer, because then they could have been bailed out and saved? Conventional banking allows for failure that is natural for any marketplace. You’d think someone as clearly anti-regulation as he is would agree.
It’s possible that, rather than breaking up the banks, they might simply be regulated more strongly to increase transparency and decrease complex risk. I would personally favor something faster than that, but if it works to end “too big to fail,” I’ll take it.